Chapter 4

**Engagement:**

*Forward Presence and Engagement to Prevent Crisis, Build Partnerships & Relationships and Assure Access*

**Introduction**

The forward presence of naval forces serves to contain and deter regional adversaries while increasing the engagement opportunities with allies and partners. Engagement forward prevents crisis, builds partners & relationships and assure access. The importance of seamless interoperability with allies and effective coordination with partners cannot be overstated. The imperative to build and sustain partnerships that measurably contribute to security, deterrence and combat effectiveness comes at a time when sensitivity to U.S. bases overseas is rising and the overall number of U.S. forces stationed on foreign soil is much lower than during the Cold War. In this context, sea-based forward presence provides the opportunity to conduct cooperative activities with allies and an expanding set of international partners, while minimizing the political, economic, cultural, and social impacts sometimes associated with forward stationed U.S. forces.

Engagement in conjunction with that forward presence has usually consisted of short duration bilateral training exercises afloat and ashore. Marines and Sailors may have perceived these events simply in terms of training exercises; they were actually supporting the higher purpose of security cooperation and relationship building. In reality, security cooperation activities are mainstream Marine Corps operations, rather than activities conducted only when forces are not occupied with other missions. They are planned, sourced, and executed through existing joint and Service processes, receiving the same level of senior leader attention as other operations. Informed by an understanding of the national strategy, such exercises take on significance well beyond their training value.
The combination of forward stationed and rotationally deployed forces is a uniquely adaptable means to maintain global military presence while respecting the sovereignty of other nations. The presence of forward naval forces provides American policymakers with an expansive range of options to influence events and project power in peacetime, crisis, and war. These options are largely the result of interoperability with ally and partner maritime forces, achieved through effective, steady-state engagement activities; and the flexible employment of naval force packages that are tailored to specific capacity building, security cooperation or crisis response requirements.

- Building partner capacity is the most often cited purpose—enabling partners to ensure their own security will reduce the need for our forces to deploy and operate at the low end of conflict.

- Secondarily, our presence should increase the understanding between diverse cultures. Americans have many misperceptions about foreign cultures and unfortunately our future partners have many perceptions about Americans that are true. Increasing the instances of working together will help reinforce the correct perceptions and perhaps mend the misperceptions.

- Conducting forward presence develops our expeditionary capabilities in a cooperative environment providing the training necessary to operate in austere uncertain or hostile environments.

The Marine Corps conducts planned activities focused on enhancing regional ties and relationships, such as security cooperation and security force assistance; maritime security operations; major training and readiness exercises; humanitarian and civic assistance. These activities build the foundation to address regional challenges with multinational partners. The combatant commanders’ demand for forward postured amphibious forces—amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine expeditionary units (ARG/MEUs)—exceeds the current and forecast capacity of the Naval Service. Since 2007 the combatant commanders’ cumulative requests for amphibious forces have grown 86 percent for ARG/MEUs and 53 percent for individually deployed amphibious ships with Marine detachments.
While demand has increased the security environment of increased uncertainty, complexity and rapid change complicates the ability of the force to conduct engagement. Increased competition for influence, the rise of new actors, the increased flow of information, proliferation of weapons, democratization of technology, and diminished force structure and resources all challenge our ability to engage forward.

The challenge is to engage globally distributed, mission-tailored forces across a wide range of missions that promote stability, prevent crises and combat terrorism; while maintaining the capability to regionally concentrate credible combat power to protect U.S. vital interests, assure friends, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries. Forward forces and forces surged from the United States, along with those of allies and partners, must be sufficiently ready and interoperable to respond effectively across a broad spectrum of crises.

**Description of the Military Problem**

The combatant commanders’ demand for Marine Corps forces to build partner capacity through security force assistance and cooperative engagement greatly exceeds current and future capacity of forward-postured ARG/MEUs or MARSOC units. Additionally, many security cooperation missions call for more discrete and tailored force structure options. Per the CCJO and DOD planning guidance, the Marine Corps must increase its capability and capacity to conduct steady-state security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities, without forfeiting the ability to conduct major operations, to include forcible entry, when required. It must do so with no increase in force structure, at minimal cost, and without reducing its contribution to ongoing operations.

**Central Idea**

The Marine Corps will examine alternative means to increase forward engagement.

- Examine initiatives to increase employability and availability of Marines aboard Navy and Coast Guard platforms beyond
amphibious ships.

- Examine regionalization of Marine forces to increase understanding.
- Blend existing general purpose forces with new and/or enhanced specialized capabilities to provide an expanded array of capabilities for engagement activities.
- Develop engagement enabling capabilities (within the operating forces and supporting establishment) to expand the force options and capabilities the Marine Corps can provide to the Geographic Combatant Commands’ engagement and security force assistance requirements.

The combination of general purpose and specialized forces’ capabilities gives the Corps tiered expertise throughout the force that will result in the ability to:

- Increase Naval forward presence capabilities and capacities for engagement within the littorals
- Enhance integration with the Navy and Coast Guard for maritime security operations
- Provide subject matter experts and mobile training teams
- Conduct or support bi-lateral or multinational training and exercises
- Provide security assistance training on defense articles purchased through the Foreign Military Sales program
- Provide indirect support, or direct support not involving combat, to Foreign Internal Defense activities
- Conduct select civil-military operations, to include foreign humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic action, and military civic action

**Marines Afloat**

By embarking Marines aboard a wider variety of naval vessels, we can expand the capability and capacity to conduct discrete, sea-based engagement with a greater number of partner nations. Doing so will have the additional advantage of increasing the flexibility and utility of these vessels for the range of military operations. For example, Marine detachments can be placed aboard large surface combatants, littoral combatants, and cutters to conduct maritime security force assistance with coalition and partner nation naval forces, or proactive humanitarian assistance with local populations. Furthermore, Marine detachments could provide a boarding and raiding capability on each ship, along with enhanced force protection capabilities. When crises or natural disasters occur, these Marines could go ashore to provide site reconnaissance, liaison, terminal guidance, or other enabling tasks to facilitate the introduction of additional naval, joint, other agency, or non-governmental organization resources.

Marine detachments afloat may also benefit from the enhanced MAGTF operations initiative, which is geared towards improving the self-sufficiency of smaller units so that they can operate over greater ranges and for extended durations.

**Regionalization**

Regionalization is the process through which individual Marines and specific units develop intellectual focus and operational expertise on a specific geographic region. Continued expansion of regionalization will ensure forces have a strong cultural foundation and are regionally knowledgeable. Current MAGTF and naval force packages may be complemented by alternative, non-standardized approaches and options appropriate to a broader range of missions. These may include joint, interagency, multinational, international, and non-government organization partnership on projects of mutual interest. Adaptive force
packaging can be leveraged to achieve greater global presence and engagement.

None of the Services can engage everywhere—all the time. Therefore, the enhanced engagement espoused is ‘selective’. It is based on direction contained in *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* and Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) priorities. Although capable of responding to tasking anywhere, the Marine Corps will identify countries in each GCC’s area of responsibility that are best suited for engagement by Marines. These areas will include nations that have Marine/Naval Infantry units, coastal areas and significant delta/riverine systems where an integrated naval team is desirable, and countries where long-standing relationships have not been developed and the misperceptions of differing cultures are greatest.

As such, we are examining the regionalization of our major headquarters as follows:

- I MEF oriented on US Central Command (USCENTCOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM), and US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) (west coast of Central and South America {Guatemala, Colombia, Panama}).

- II MEF oriented on USCENTCOM, US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), US European Command (USEUCOM), and USSOUTHCOM (east coast of Central and South America {Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica}).

- III MEF oriented on USPACOM and, as required by force providers, USCENTCOM.

During phase 2 of this effort, the Marine Corps will focus the warfighting and force provider commands as follows:

- I MEF oriented on USCENTCOM, USPACOM, and western coast of USSOUTHCOM.
• II MEF oriented on USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and the eastern coast of USSOUTHCOM.

• III MEF oriented on USPACOM.

Blend Enhanced and Specialized Capabilities

Increased capacity at the MARFOR will provide the supporting MEF units with a persistent engagement element that links to the GCC, country teams, and partner militaries. MARFORS provide regional expertise and will establish personal relations with key regional individuals while maintaining knowledge of the diverse range of organizations (e.g. interagency, multi-national, non-governmental organizations) located in the region. They will seek to integrate activities whenever possible, deconflict when integration is not possible, and coordinate and collaborate with as many elements in the operating environment as possible. These efforts will increase the ability to create a level of synergy among partners that truly helps build partner capacity in a coherent manner.

Specialized engagement-enabling capabilities and enhancements at various echelons and general purpose force capabilities within each Marine Expeditionary Force will substantially increase the quality of specially tailored training teams, global fleet stations detachments, or elements that are sourced in support of combatant commander requirements. Close coordination and planning between the Service component, Navy and Marine Corps Security Cooperation enabling organizations, GCC, country team, and the host nation are essential to effective engagement. The capabilities and enhancements will include subject matter experts to the general purpose forces conducting the engagement activities providing depth for the force and increasing effectiveness for the supported GCC. The proposed enhancements include:

•Increased MARFOR component capacity for coordination which will serve to integrate Marine Corps forces into:
  – Security cooperation engagements
  – Security force assistance
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− Foreign internal defense
− Civil-military operations

• A Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) coordinates USMC Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts, provides general military skills training and advisor support to host nation security forces (HNSF) or to General Purpose Forces (GPF) partnering with HNSF, and provides planning assistance to MARFORs in developing and executing partner nation training programs in order to build partner capacity in support of Combatant Commander SFA objectives. MCTAG provides institutional capacity to provide training and advisor support.

• Examine the need for MEF-level capabilities and enhancements such as:
  − Civil Affairs (CA) planning and execution forces
  − Foreign training/advisory units
  − Liaison structure
  − Increased cultural expertise (e.g. Foreign Area Officers/Regional Area Officers, civilian anthropologists)
  − Information Operations detachment with Psychological Operations planning capability embedded
  − A commander who is responsible for providing the unified, specialized engagement support required by deploying forces.
  − A commander who is responsible for "operationalizing" IO and an IO Coordination Center to oversee and influence Information Operations across the MEF and Joint IO effort—with links to the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (described in the next section).

Supporting Establishment Organizations

To support requirements for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, and military engagement the Marine Corps has established an array of engagement-enabling organizations and refined other standing organizations. The following
engagement-enabling organizations will contribute to preparing, supporting and in some cases augmenting Marine forces conducting engagement activities:

- **Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)**- MCIA is the Marine Corps’ service intelligence production center and provides reach-back for tailored expeditionary intelligence analysis and cultural studies to Marine Corps operating forces, other services and the intelligence community. In addition, MCIA can provide highly focused pre-deployment training, as well as augment units with specialized teams and liaison officers.

- **Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC)**- SCETC is responsible for implementing and evaluating U.S. Marine Corps Security Cooperation (SC) education, training, and programs in order to support Marine Component Commands’ efforts to build partner capacity. It sources, organizes, and trains security cooperation and security assistance teams from the supporting establishment and assists operating force planning for security cooperation and security assistance activities as required. SCETC maintains in-depth knowledge of the authorities, funding regulations and Department of State policies needed to support Marine Corps security assistance activities for implementing tasks associated with the foreign military financing program (FMFP), international military education and training (IMET), foreign military sales, and peace operations.

- **Center for Advanced Operational and Culture Learning (CAOCL)**- CAOCL is the U.S. Marine Corps agency for operational culture, regional studies and language familiarization training and education. CAOCL is the only USMC institution singularly focused on regional understanding, culture and language and its effects on operations. CAOCL in conjunction with the USMC Senior Language Authority has the responsibility for all operational culture and operational language aspects of the DOTMLPF process, including: policy, training, education, and validation of required capabilities and training.
• **Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW)**- CIW develops and coordinates Irregular Warfare concepts, policy and doctrine for the U.S. Marine Corps. CIW focuses on the primary and supporting activities that comprise Irregular Warfare: Counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter-Terrorism (CT), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Stability Operations, Information Operations, Intelligence, and Interagency Operations.

• **Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC)**- MCIOC is the executive agent for the U.S. Marine Corps IO Program and is responsible for implementing and evaluating USMC IO education, training, and programs in order to support institutional USMC and MARFOR IO-related partnership building efforts. MCIOC provides MAGTF commanders and the Marine Corps a full-spectrum IO planning and PSYOP capability by means of deployable support teams and a comprehensive IO reach-back capability in order to support the integration of IO into Marine Corps operations.

• **Marine Corps Systems Command – International Programs (MCSC-IP)**- MCSC IP provides assistance to, and cooperation with, allied and other friendly nations pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. MCSC IP explores international opportunities to support CCDR and regional MARFOR Theater Security Cooperation priorities, providing systems, logistics, technology, and follow-on support to international partners. MCSC IP promotes the exchange of technologies and equipment with international partners by initiating, coordinating, and managing cooperative research and development.

• **Advisor Training Groups (ATG)**- ATG train U.S. Marine Corps Transition Teams to advise, mentor, and train foreign military, police, and border units in operational techniques and procedures to combat terrorism and to counter an insurgency.
Engagement Conducted by General-Purpose Forces

MEUs will remain a central element of the Marine Corps—forward-deployed, expeditionary forces postured to respond to missions across the ROMO. Some elements of the MEF with specialized engagement-enabling capabilities will be task-organized for deployment with each MEU while additional elements will be aligned to the deployed MEU in a reach-back capacity. Additional pre-deployment training for Marines and Sailors will prepare ARG/MEU personnel for increased performance of engagement activities. When ARGs/MEUs deploy they will routinely disperse to accomplish engagement activities, affording the supported combatant commander maximum employment options. ARGs/MEUs will conduct distributed operations by deploying smaller task forces or single ships while maintaining the ability to re-aggregate and respond to emergent requirements.

Additionally, each MEF will form a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force for Security Cooperation, or SC MAGTFs of up to 500 Marines and Sailors. Drawn from subordinate commands focused on different regions of interest, these SC MAGTFs will be formed for a designated period on a rotational basis, within the larger framework of the overall training, exercise and employment plan for Marine Corps forces (this includes forces assigned to the Unit Deployment Program supporting PACOM). Once formed, each SC MAGTF will undergo a training cycle preparatory to its attachment to a GCC. Upon completion of the training cycle, it will be attached directly to a GCC through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan for approximately six months. Based on the GCC’s operational requirements, the SC MAGTF commander may execute assigned missions using all or part of his force. The SC MAGTF will usually only deploy those elements needed for the mission. Deployment may be directly to the mission area, to a forward operating base, forward operating site or cooperative security location to associate with equipment and integrate with other assistance elements, or by embarking on naval shipping to maneuver within the operating area.

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8. Main operating bases are permanent bases with resident forces and robust infrastructure to support command and control, training, and the deployment and reconstitution of forces.
while maintaining a minimal footprint in the host country. Naval shipping will often be amphibious ships. However, deployment alternatives will expand and may include littoral combat ships, destroyers, joint high speed vessels, maritime prepositioning ships and other vessels to maximize options that support GCC and country team requirements. A SC MAGTF will be able to conduct sequential, simultaneous, or overlapping missions of varying duration and location by task-organizing and deploying:

- **Training, Advisor, and Assessment Teams** of 5-15 Marines and Sailors who will episodically deploy for short-duration missions of approximately 15 days.

- **Detachments** of 15-200 Marines and Sailors who will episodically deploy for medium-duration missions of 30-90 days.

- **Special purpose MAGTFs for Security Cooperation (SC MAGTF)** of 200-500 Marines and Sailors who will episodically deploy for longer-duration missions of 90-150 days.

SC MAGTFs are not envisioned to have significant crisis response capabilities. However, like all MAGTFs, Marines will possess the basic skills to conduct limited reinforcement as required. These SC MAGTFs will operate with a diverse set of partners. In many locales, Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) will be conducting parallel operations—simultaneously. Efforts must be made to integrate activities or ensure they complement one another. Marine units can both leverage SOF (e.g. established relationships with local military/civilian leaders, intelligence sources) and support SOF (e.g. mobility, logistics). Establishing relationships and sharing information early in pre-deployment training will increase synergy once deployed.

The development of SC MAGTFs and regionalization-sourcing may change tasking and command relationships:

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9. When sourcing of CCDR requirements falls outside the SP MAGTF construct, it is envisioned current processes and procedures remain germane.
**Marine Regiment**

Existing Methodology

Marine components to a GCC conduct security cooperation assessments within the theater, provide input to the GCC Theater Campaign Plan, and publish a supporting plan. The Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) publishes a campaign support plan to prioritize Marine Corps security cooperation efforts. The global force management process validates specific mission requirements and sends to joint force providers to source. Marine Forces Command determines appropriate sourcing, submits to PP&O, who approves the plan and publishes Marine Corps Bulletin 3120. Specific units which meet the requirements are listed in the force synchronization playbook. The MEFs, and Marine Forces Reserve source units per the playbook. Designated unit commanders conduct detailed mission analysis, identify resource deficiencies and the MEFs source or request assistance from throughout the Marine Corps operating forces and supporting establishment. MEFs conduct pre-deployment training and certify the task organized units for deployment. Upon deployment to the AOR, Operational Control of the unit is delegated to the MARFOR.
SC MAGTF

Suggested Methodology

Marine components to a GCC conduct security cooperation assessments within the theater, provide input to the GCC Theater Campaign Plan, and publish a supporting plan. The Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) publishes a campaign support plan to prioritize Marine Corps security cooperation efforts. The global force management process validates specific mission requirements and sends to joint force providers to source. Marine Forces Command determines appropriate sourcing, submits to PP&O, who approves the plan and publishes Marine Corps Bulletin 3120. A SC MAGTF is formed from regionally focused units within the MEF and enhanced with specialized engagement enabling capabilities from the operating forces and supporting establishment (e.g. MCTAG, MCIOC, MCAG) to meet a series of requirements listed in the force synchronization playbook. The MEF conducts pre-deployment training and certifies the SC MAGTF for attachment to supported GCC. The SC MAGTF is OPCON to the Marine component and deploys teams, detachments and special purpose MAGTFs in accordance with the plan. As emerging requirements develop, the SC MAGTF deploys elements to satisfy the requirement if within its organic capability.

*modified text underlined for emphasis

Rotational Models

Rotational Marine forces that support engagement initiatives include MEUs and SP MAGTFs; including those sourced from units in the Unit Deployment Program (UDP). Sourcing options may change over time as requirements to support named operations emerge. The preferred sourcing model for SP MAGTFs is similar to the air contingency force construct of the 1990’s whereby scalable, task-organized packages are tailored for specific missions and only the element that is needed is deployed. Regimental and/or aviation group commanders and their headquarters would serve at the SP MAGTF Commander/CEs. Units assigned to the SP MAGTF will often have recently returned from deployment retaining the highly trained core of the unit, orienting its
training toward engagement activities, and assigning specialized engagement forces to the base unit.

Due to operational commitments in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the Marine Corps will employ different rotational models in the near and mid-to-far terms. The near term model expands engagement activities while not overstressing the force as it supports current operations. The mid-to-far term model maximizes both engagement and forward deployed crisis response capabilities.

- **Near Term (OEF surge).** For illustrative purposes we will have 6 infantry battalions committed in CENTCOM with a 1:2 deployed-to-dwell ratio (accounts for 18 infantry battalions). 9 infantry battalions remain to support engagement and crisis response.
  - 1 CENTCOM rotational MEU presence
  - 1 PACOM Forward Deployed Naval Force forward-based presence
  - 1 SP MAGTF available for global sourcing (SOUTHCOM, EUCOM or AFRICOM)

- **Mid-to-Far Term (post-OEF surge).** The post-OEF surge rotational model’s goal is to increase the deployed-to-dwell ratio to 1:3. This allows increased training and readiness of the general purpose force. The potential deployment orientation of these forces is:
  - 1 CENTCOM Forward Deployed Naval Force forward-based presence or rotational MEU
  - 1 EUCOM / AFRICOM rotational MEU presence
  - 1 PACOM Forward Deployed Naval Force forward-based presence
  - 4 SP MAGTFs (SOUTHCOM, EUCOM or AFRICOM)
  - 3 Unit Deployment Program Battalions

Although an SP MAGTF is not envisioned for support to NORTHCOM, it is expected that increased USMC security cooperation activities will take place in that GCC.
Combat Development Implications

• **Doctrine**
  - Current joint and Marine Corps doctrine will need to be reviewed for sufficiency.
  - Although a DoD-wide definition for security force assistance is not yet approved, security force assistance is a term associated with building partner nations’ security capacity and is part of the broader set of activities defined as Security Cooperation. Once the DOD Directive on security force assistance is released, a review of the approach on how to integrate SFA into Marine Corps doctrine is warranted. The approach could range from incorporating a section into MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* to a stand-alone doctrinal publication.
  - Joint doctrine must be reviewed in coordination with GCCs to ensure that assignment of home-based Marine forces to GCCs for employment in engagement activities can achieve a desirable level of responsiveness. Additionally, an analysis of command relationships within combatant commander areas of responsibility may be warranted.

• **Organization**
  - Expanding engagement capability and capacity may be accomplished in part through organizational changes. There will be an increased need for liaison elements to coordinate with diverse organizations such as country teams, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), interagency and non-governmental organizations, and multi-national partners. Some liaison elements may reside with the MARFOR headquarters, the MCTAG, the MEF, and at Headquarters Marine Corps. Organizational changes can be accomplished incrementally. For example, the MEF HQ group-construct is notionally upwards of 600 personnel per MEF consisting of headquarters, advisory, liaison, civil affairs, and information/psychological operations personnel. Initially, the organization could be formed consisting of approximately 200 personnel per MEF. As the engagement
programs mature and assessments confirm proof of concept, the MEF HQ group could grow commensurate with recognized utility of each sub-element of the organization.

- Establishing new organizations and expanding others, as discussed above, will require hard choices about from where to reduce or divest. Assuming at least initially that there will not be a manpower increase beyond the 202K means adjustments to 202K and the current force structure will be required. A detailed review will be required to determine where shifts should take place.

- There are numerous potential constructs for organizing a SP MAGTF for Security Cooperation. This concept proposes one based upon a model similar to an alert contingency MAGTF with minor differences. One difference is the SP MAGTF is attached to a GCC. Another is that although the construct contains all the elements of a MAGTF, when employed it is organized in a non-standard manner. Instead of employment via ground combat element, aviation combat element, and a logistics combat element, the proposed construct has a training/advising/engagement element and a support element. The first element conducts the actual mission sets while the second element provides support to the first element. This subtle difference connotes an emphasis on building partner capacity versus one on crisis response/warfighting. SP MAGTFs are likely to evolve over time. The requirements in each supported GCC will drive tailoring of the supporting MAGTF. The need to tailor units based on mission requirements is not new to the Marine Corps. However, the type of tailoring required to support enhanced engagement might require other force development initiatives beyond operational force tailoring.

- Figure 2 below depicts a potential construct for a SC MAGTF organization. The actual organization will depend on the results of experimentation and assessments.
• **Training**
  
  A pre-assignment training program to common essential tasks and GCC-specific tasks, similar to the models for pre-deployment training in support of MEU or UDP deployments, oriented on engagement activities, cultural awareness, training foreign partners, etc. must be developed. It must be structured with common program elements for all units as well as specific elements that support regionalization. The training program construct will depend upon the chosen model for Marine Corps force provision (i.e. will some units be permanently designated as MEUs, UDP, or SP MAGTF—or will there be a more rotational model employed?). Regardless of how the force is provisioned, a requirement remains for each unit to train for proficiency in the full range of mission essential tasks to include warfighting/crisis response missions as well as security cooperation/security force assistance tasks. Resources (personnel, funding, training venues) will be required for the training establishment to support engagement initiatives.
− The initiatives that have emphasized and expanded cultural and language training will need to be maintained and diversified, and not atrophy once participation in current operations scale down.
− Expanded engagement opportunities may include training host nation personnel in the United States. In some cases, individuals and units from partner nations would benefit more from coming to the U.S. and receiving training using our robust infrastructure rather than training in their home countries. This technique should receive equal emphasis in planning/coordination with GCCs.

- **Materiel**
  There are a myriad of potential material implications derived from this discussion and this section does not propose a comprehensive list. Some of the potentially important materiel implications may include:

  − Refinement of requirements for prepositioned equipment and supplies that support engagement activities. Plans could include a combination of using Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons, prepositioning equipment sets ashore in critical locations, and utilizing designated Main Operating Bases, Forward Operating Sites, or Cooperative Security Locations to support deployed forces. This review must take a measured approach and find a solution that provides effective operational support and cost effectiveness.

  − Many partners are outfitted with non-U.S. weapons, vehicles and equipment. To effectively train those forces, Marines require familiarity with those systems. The Marine Corps will need to review and expand its procurement of non-US weapons systems for ‘train-the-trainer’ programs. For systems the Marine Corps does not purchase, it should seek arrangements with other joint services and partner militaries to leverage their systems for “train-the-trainer programs.”

  − Training foreign partners will often entail ‘give away’ and ‘leave behind’ materials. Whether building material used to teach construction of a fortified position or used to create a
simulator to train marksmanship with an AK-47, the Marine Corps must budget for and utilize Title 10 and receive authorization for Title 22 funding to support engagement initiatives. Included will be the need for special allocations and/or authorities for ammunition and other training consumables, as well as determining which costs are borne by the supported GCC, by Marine Corps operations and management funds, and other sources of funding.

- Dispersed small-team operations, often in austere environments, will place a premium on digital and satellite communications-gear and improved translation devices.
- All rotary-wing and tilt-rotor squadrons should be organized and equipped specifically to accommodate supporting operations with detachments—of an increasingly smaller composition.

- **Leadership and Education**

  - Leadership, education and training are the cornerstone for effectively conducting security force assistance and other engagement activities. As with the pre-assignment training section above, education efforts must continue to emphasize cultural education and include regional orientation for officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers.

  - The Marine Corps should seek to expand opportunities for U.S. personnel to attend partner nation (current allies, coalition partners and nations with whom we seek to build security force capability and capacity) professional development courses and for partner nation personnel to attend Marine Corps schools. Personal and institutional relationships formed during these opportunities should be cultivated and actively maintained over time.

  - Engagement activities will continue to increase the interaction and cooperative activities between Marines and interagency partners. Where possible, the Marine Corps should seek to send more Marines to interagency education venues, request additional exchange opportunities, encourage interagency personnel to lecture and participate in
cooperative forums, and impart knowledge about the other U.S. government agencies in our formal schools.

− Besides educational opportunities with security force partners and interagency elements, the Marine Corps should search for opportunities to send Marines to take part in and learn from other organizations. These opportunities may include fellowships to academia, exchange tours with certain multinational corporations, or immersion experiences with missionaries and non-government organizations.

• **Personnel**

− Career management that supports expanded engagement activities will be an important issue. A combination of primary MOSs, secondary MOSs, and billet MOSs will be needed to provide adequate numbers of Marines with the requisite skills. In some cases, our mix of active and reserve components will need to be adjusted to meet the demands of the future security environment. In other cases, such as for civil affairs capability, active duty units may need to be formed to provide the professional core around which Marines possessing a secondary MOS are placed—expanding overall capacity. Finding the correct balance between specialization in support of engagement, and general purpose trained and oriented on engagement yet possessing the ability to operate across the ROMO, will require difficult decisions. A mix of incentives and specific precepts for promotion opportunities may be needed especially in the early stages of implementation.

− Assignment patterns and policies should be aligned to support regionalization. The goal would be to ensure Marines have repeated tours in units that concentrate on specific regions. A specific review of Foreign Area Officers/Regional Area Officers (FAO/RAO) assignment may be warranted. There are likely niche countries, especially those countries having a Marine Corps or other maritime forces that Marine Corps FAO/RAO or other specialized personnel should be aligned with.
In some cases, there may be a benefit to waiving enlistment criteria for individuals with unique or desirable qualifications. For example, individuals with language capabilities or county-specific knowledge who otherwise might not fit all enlistment criteria could be important contributors to Marine Corps engagement activities.

To complement regionalization initiatives, assist commanders in identifying personnel with skill-sets related to security force assistance tasks or country specific experience, and to satisfy department of defense requirements, the Marine Corps will need to update what it tracks in its personnel tracking system. There will be a need to identify what specific categories to track. Caution should be used initially when determining what skill sets and experiences to track. Too much data entry could make the data unusable. Consideration should be given to prior civilian work experience and education when making occupation specialty selections at The Basic School.

- **Facilities**
  - Establish Marine Corps facilities at designated Forward Operating Sites, or Cooperative Security Locations.
  - Create training venues in the U.S. and engagement with combatant commanders for training venues abroad that support engagement activities.

**Conclusion**

The security of the United States is intrinsically linked to that of the broader international community. NDS 2008 states “the best way to achieve security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the international system” emphasizing “building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners for long-term security.”

As the Nation’s naval expeditionary, force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps has throughout its history routinely innovated to protect and promote our national interests. In an era of increasing global interconnectedness the Marine Corps is once again building upon its legacy of adaptability to enhance its operational utility. Furthermore,
increased security cooperation may also provide opportunity to enhance access. Such operations build relations with partners and may help shape the operating area by alleviating the sources of discontent that may breed extremism. This is especially beneficial when forward postured naval forces are tasked to respond to crisis as discussed in the following chapter. To that end, Marines will remain general purpose forces that fight and win our Nation’s battles while increasing its means to work with foreign civil authorities and militaries to improve interoperability and build partner capability and capacity.